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Bounded rationality in transposition processes: the case of the European patients’ rights directive1 
 
Hans Vollaard and Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen 







Studies explaining the timeliness and correctness of the transposition of EU directives into national 
legislation have provided rather inconclusive findings. Therefore, they do not offer a clear-cut prediction 
concerning the transposition of the patients’ rights directive, which is one of the first that concerns the 
organisation and financing of national healthcare systems. This paper applies the perspective of 
bounded rationality to explain (irregularities in) the timely and correct transposition of EU directives. 
The cognitive and organisational constraints long posited by the bounded rationality perspective may 
affect the commonly employed explanatory factors of administrative capacities, misfit, and the 
heterogeneity of preferences among veto players. To prevent retrospective rationalisation of the 
transposition process, this paper traces this process as it unfolded in Denmark and the Netherlands. As 
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bounded rationality is apparent in the transposition processes in these relatively well-organised 




Many policy sectors in the member states of the European Union (EU) have been confronted with the 
transposition of EU directives into national legislation. The healthcare sector is a relative latecomer in 
this respect. Adopted in 2011, Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border 
healthcare (hereafter, the patients’ rights directive) is one of the first concerning the organisation, 
financing and provision of diagnosis, care and cure to ill persons (to be distinguished from public health, 
which refers to policy measures to increase the physical and mental well-being of all persons). Little is 
known about implementation of EU law in the healthcare sector (Lamping 2013), but transposition 
studies of other policy sectors may indicate how it could unfold. The scholarly literature on the 
transposition of EU directives has grown substantially over the last two decades. A wide variety of 
factors have been indicated to explain the timeliness and correctness of transposition. However, the 
transposition literature does not provide unequivocal expectations for the timely and correct 
transposition of directives in a ‘new’ healthcare sector. Administrative capacity and domestic opposition 
seem to be influential factors, but transposition studies continue to struggle with “inconclusive”, 
“contradictory”, or “inconsistent” findings concerning the factors explaining timely and correct 
transposition (Steunenberg and Rhinard 2010; Toshkov 2010; Toshkov et al. 2010; Treib 2008). 
This inconclusiveness could result from the particular countries and policy sectors studied or the 
imprecise measurements used (Toshkov 2010; Toshkov et al. 2010). Sensitivity to contextual specificities 
can provide firmer conclusions regarding timely and correct transposition (Steunenberg and Rhinard 
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2010). This article therefore explores the transposition process of the patients’ rights directive in detail 
to determine the specific factors in the underexplored healthcare sector. It also delves into this process 
for theoretical reasons. Implementation processes (including transposition) are often as messy and 
conflictive as other policy processes (Barrett 2004; Pülzl and Treib 2007). As theories on bounded 
rationality have long noted, preferences, problems, solutions, and decision-making processes can be 
fairly unclear to the actors involved, due to their cognitive constraints such as limited attention and 
organisational complexities such as the fluidity of participants or disjoint policy-circuits (Simon 1985; 
Cohen et al. 1972). This is of particular relevance in the complex decision-making machinery of the EU 
(Jones 2001: 196; Nowak 2010; Olsen 2001; Richardson 2005; Zahariadis 2007: 86) and even more so 
when a distracting economic crisis with ensuing budget cuts is taking place. The inconclusiveness in 
transposition studies could thus arise from the actors’ varying cognitive and organisational possibilities 
to understand a directive and its (mis)fit with national legislation, develop clear preferences, or adopt 
proper strategies in a timely manner to support or oppose its transposition. The research question in 
this paper is therefore whether bounded rationality, in part, explains whether and how directives are 
timely and correctly transposed and how this is related to the commonly employed explanatory factors 
of administrative capacity, misfit and veto player preferences. 
The only way to determine whether, when and how cognitive and organisational constraints interact 
with other potential explanatory factors and relate to the timeliness and correctness of transposition is 
to examine the transposition process as it unfolds. Process-tracing during the transposition of the 
patients’ rights directive has been employed to avoid post-hoc rationalisations of strategies by the 
actors involved. Two cases of well-administered countries, Denmark and The Netherlands, are selected 
to examine whether bounded rationality is apparent even in these countries and thus may constitute a 
more general factor affecting transposition across member states. 
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This article proceeds as follows. After an evaluation of the transposition literature and the potential 
contribution of the bounded rationality perspective in section 2, the case selection, methods and 
empirical sources are discussed in section 3. The latter section also presents the origins and contents of 
the patients’ rights directive. Following reports on the Danish and Dutch cases in sections 4 and 5, 
respectively, the final section presents conclusions regarding whether bounded rationality affects the 
transposition process and its outcomes. If so, bounded rationality should be emphatically considered in 
future transposition research. 
 
2. Explaining the timely and correct transposition of EU directives: a matter of bounded rationality? 
Explaining the regularities and irregularities in the transposition of EU directives into the national 
legislation of EU member states has been an important subject in EU studies. Transposition studies 
reveal that the administrative capacities of member states and the heterogeneity of preferences among 
the relevant domestic actors seem to be the most influential factors explaining (un)timely and 
(in)correct transposition (for reviews of the transposition literature, see Toshkov 2010; Toshkov et al. 
2010; Treib 2008). A lack of administrative capacities (financial, human and organisational resources 
such as staff expertise and coordination strength) could explain delayed and incorrect transposition (see 
also Vasev and Vrangbæk (2014), this volume, for the importance of sector-specific resources). If their 
preferences differ, veto players, such as the ministries and sub-national authorities involved in 
transposition, can delay transposition using their blocking power. Misfit between EU legislation and 
domestic policy legacies has often been examined as explanatory factor but rarely seems significant. In 
general, transposition studies have remained inconclusive regarding the factors explaining transposition. 
 Given this inconclusiveness, transposition studies could benefit from theories on domestic policy-
making, rather than EU-specific ones (Treib 2008: 19). The bounded rationality perspective is well-
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situated in this respect. Due to its complexity, the EU is a “solid candidate” to qualify as a so-called 
organised anarchy (Zahariadis 2007: 86). In an organised anarchy, preferences, problems, and decision-
making processes are rather ambiguous and unclear among the manifold actors, whose involvement is 
often fluid (Cohen et al. 1972: 1). In particular, in these complex contexts, rife with uncertainty, actors 
have limited opportunities to take well-informed, rational decisions, instead tending to act under 
‘bounded rationality’ (Simon 1985). Devoting attention to actors’ cognitive constraints and the 
organisational complexities in which they operate might offer a better understanding of the 
inconsistencies in the explanations of transposition.  
Rational choice theories suppose that actors have sufficient resources and information to conduct a 
comprehensive analysis of the transposition alternatives and their effects to adopt a strategy to 
maximise the net value of expected returns for themselves. They thus assume that the preferences of 
these actors are fixed, rank-ordered and unambiguous and decision-making procedures are clear. 
However, organisation theory and behavioural decision theory have long highlighted the limitations of 
these rational choice assumptions as descriptive and predictive models of human behaviour (Jones 
1999). Actors rather act under bounded rationality, which is “…behavior that is adaptive within the 
constraints imposed both by the external situation and by the capacities of the decision maker” (Simon 
1985: 294). Bounded rationality does not assume that actors are irrational. Individuals generally have 
reasons for what they do (Simon 1985: 297). However, due to the complexity of political life and actors’ 
cognitive limitations, policy choices are not made according to rational procedures. Instead of surveying 
the overall situation and weighing different alternatives against one another, actors have limited 
attention spans. Actors behave according to habituation and routine, opting for a satisfactory, instead of 
the optimal, solution. When confronted with major policy changes, they tend to mobilise their serial 
processing capacity instead of acting in a utility-maximising manner (Jones 1999: 303). A limited 
attention span implies that actors do not consider all implications of a decision but make what they can 
6 
 
of the situation, thus only examining the most relevant aspects. As Simon noted, “[p]eople are, at best, 
rational in terms of what they are aware of, and they can be aware of only tiny, disjointed facets of 
reality” (Simon 1985: 302). In other words, actors’ information processing is often not optimal, and even 
if information is available, it is often ignored (Jones 1999: 310). 
Information could enhance rational decision-making. The more and the longer actors have been 
involved in policy processes, the better they may analyse policy alternatives and their consequences and 
act accordingly in a strategic manner. However, more and better information does not necessarily limit 
differences in views, perspectives and priorities among the actors involved (Zahariadis 2007: 66). 
Decision-making is not only a matter of uncertainty (actors lacking information) but also of ambiguity 
(actors’ diverse understandings of information). Ambiguity complicates the rational pursuit of 
preferences by an organisation, as the ultimate goals are unclear to the actors involved (Jones 1999: 
308). Certain organisations are more prone to ambiguity and uncertainty than others. This notion is 
central to the garbage can theory developed by Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972) and the policy streams 
model advanced by Kingdon (1984). Due to the complex and fragmented nature of an organisation, such 
as a national government or a university, actors are unable to complete grasp the decision-making 
process. Given the fluidity of participants and variety of disjoint policy-circuits in the decision-making 
process, attention can only be selective. This allows strategic actors (policy-entrepreneurs) to 
manipulate the content and timing of information to link a (self-perceived) problem to their favoured 
(pre-existing) solution. Policy choices thus rather emerge from the organised anarchy than result from a 
well-considered selection of alternatives for a given problem. 
Studies of bounded rationality have largely focused on the choices made in the agenda-setting parts of 
policy processes. Nevertheless, there is no reason that this perspective may not be fruitfully applied to 
choices made in other parts of policy processes, such as implementation (Zahariadis 2007: 80, 86). For a 
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variety of reasons, the implementation of EU law would be a prime subject for the study of bounded 
rationality. First, shared preferences among the manifold actors in the complex, multi-level, sectorally 
divided EU is rather unlikely. EU legislation reflects the compromises of 28 member states, the European 
Commission and the European Parliament. As a consequence, it often contains fuzzy, ambiguous aims. 
The discretion to select the means by which the policy goals established in EU directives are to be met 
increases uncertainty and ambiguity, particularly if the directives concerned do not neatly fit domestic 
policies. Indeed, new, complex directives offering substantial policy discretion are more likely to suffer 
from delayed and incorrect transposition (cf. Kaeding 2006; Steunenberg and Toshkov 2009). 
Furthermore, within the complex EU, actors at the national level may be unaware of evolutions at the 
EU level. The development of preferences among actors during the negotiation phase of EU directives 
could therefore coincide with a lack of preferences regarding (aspects of) the EU legislation among 
implementation actors. Additionally, the rationale behind the numerous compromises established 
during Council negotiations may be long forgotten when these compromises are to be implemented 
domestically. Further, even if manifold implementing actors are aware of the basic rationale, they could 
be overly absorbed by other domestic issues to thoroughly consider their preferences, problem analyses 
and strategies. Preferences and strategies would thus be rather developed during the implementation 
process, which would lead to actors retrospectively justify their policy choices. A change in participants 
and distractions from other policy issues, which are rather likely in massive organisational complexes 
such as the EU and the healthcare sector, could contribute to the confusion regarding strategies, 
preferences and problem analyses concerning the transposition of a directive. 
The bounded rationality perspective could thus explain why the scholarly literature is inconclusive 
concerning the factors determining the timely and correct transposition of EU directives. First, veto 
player explanations assume actors to be rational. Such an assumption is debatable. Preferences might 
not be given and fixed, while cognitive and organisational constraints hamper actors’ understandings of 
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the problem (i.e., the directive to be transposed), the (mis)fit between the directive and national 
policies, the available decision-making strategies and possible solutions. Due to organisational and 
cognitive constraints, the transposition process could eventually result in a quasi-accidental connection 
of a problem and policy solution on the part of a policy-entrepreneur. Three explanatory factors 
commonly considered in transposition studies would thus be clearly affected by bounded rationality. 
The following section explains how this paper will assess the impact of bounded rationality on the 
transposition process. 
 
3. Studying a process as it unfolds 
Qualitative case studies are best suited to examining how bounded rationality affect the transposition 
process as it unfolds (cf. Gerring 2007). Therefore, the collection of legislative documentation, reports 
from the ministries on transposition, parliamentary debates, policy papers composed by the wide 
variety of health actors and interviews with key players and experts were completed during the 
transposition process to determine how preferences, strategies, and problem analyses evolved during 
the transposition period. The cases selected are Denmark and the Netherlands. If bounded rationality 
had an impact, even in these two relatively well-organised countries, future transposition studies should 
consider this factor more emphatically. 
The phenomenon to be explained is the timeliness and correctness of the transposition of the patients’ 
rights directive into national legislation. The directive will be considered timely and correctly transposed 
if no strong criticism is raised by well-informed and independent legal experts on the implementation of 
key articles. These key articles are presented in table 1 below. The directive has a long history, riddled 
with controversies. Based on Regulation 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems (and its 
predecessors since 1958), most EU citizens could only be granted the privilege of receiving 
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reimbursement for planned healthcare obtained elsewhere in the EU. In a series of verdicts since 1998, 
the CJEU (Court of Justice of the European Union) declared cross-border healthcare to be subject to the 
free movement of goods and services in all EU healthcare systems. In principle, EU citizens therefore 
have the right to access to cross-border healthcare and its reimbursement. However, the CJEU identified 
exemptions to free movement, such as a system of prior authorisation for hospital treatment, justifiable 
for reasons of financial sustainability for national healthcare systems or the maintenance of public 
health. Many member states opposed interference by the CJEU or other EU institutions in the 
organisation and financing of their healthcare systems. The European Commission nevertheless pursued 
various means to regulate cross-border patient healthcare. After it failed to consolidate CJEU case law 
on healthcare in the “Bolkestein directive” on services in the internal market in 2004, the European 
Commission promulgated a directive specifically addressing cross-border healthcare in July 2008. The 
issue of prior authorisation of cross-border healthcare was one of the most controversial issues. The 
political agreement that the European Parliament and the Council eventually reached in the second 
reading was established by means of numerous compromises, as reflected by the directive’s 64, often 
lengthy, recitals. The eventual agreement departed from the European norm of consensus politics. 
Austria, Poland, Portugal and Romania voted against the final compromise in the Council, whereas 
Slovakia abstained from voting. After its official publication on March 9th, 2011, member states had two-
and-a-half years to transpose the directive, until October 25th, 2013. The directive covers healthcare 
generally, regardless of how it is organised, delivered or financed, except for long-term care, vaccination 
programmes or organ transplantation. The directive obliges the member states to reform existing 
information on patients’ rights to facilitate (not stimulate) cross-border healthcare (for further details, 




Articles to be 
transposed 
Most important aspects to be implemented 
4 A member state providing treatment is obliged to ensure: 
 national contact points providing information on (the supervision of) healthcare standards 
 healthcare providers provide information on treatment options, availability, quality and 
safety, and prices 
 transparent complaint procedures if patients suffer harm 
 access to the patient’s medical record 
 non-discrimination in access and pricing 
5 The member state of affiliation (in terms of health insurance) is obliged to inform patients of their 
cross-border rights and entitlements and related appeal and redress procedures 
6 Member states should establish one or more national contact points 
7 Member states are obliged to have transparent mechanisms for the calculation of treatment 
costs; member states should report to the Commission on all refusals of prior authorisation and 
the reasons thereof 
8 If prior authorisation (PA) is introduced, it is only justified for hospital care and highly specialised 
and cost-intensive care 
 PA has to be issued if treatment cannot be granted within a medically justifiable timeframe 
 Member states of affiliation shall make information publicly available regarding what 





Mutual recognition of prescriptions 




The directive contains a high level of discretion, as numerous clauses state that Member states “may” 
engage in certain actions. For instance, member states “may” deliver information on cross-border 
healthcare in other than its official language(s) and “may” cover additional costs related to cross-border 
healthcare other than those indicated in the directive. The directive also contains several articles 
concerning voluntary cooperation on issues such as health technology assessment, e-health and the 
creation of reference networks of highly specialised healthcare providers. Voluntary cooperation is not 
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examined here, as it does not have to be transposed into national legislation. Table 1 only presents 
articles that must be transposed. 
The case studies examine the transposition processes to determine the impact of bounded rationality 
and three commonly employed explanatory factors: administrative capacities, the policy (mis)fit 
between the directive and national rules and the preference heterogeneity among veto players. Table 2 
details the potential indicators of these three factors. It also indicates how the impact of bounded 
rationality could be identified.  
Factor Potential indicators 
Factor 1:  
Administrative capacities 
 experts on cross-border healthcare or general civil servants 
 many/ few staff available for transposition 
 transposition plan: yes/no 
 clear division of responsibilities for transposition: yes/no 
 information sharing among implementing actors: yes/no 
Impact of bounded 
rationality on factor1 if: 
 fluidity of implementing actors 
 disjoint policy-circuits 
 not the primary but a secondary responsibility for actors 
 distraction by other issues such as the economic crisis and budget cuts 
 limited understanding of the transposition procedure among implementing 
actors 
 adoption of satisfactory, routine solutions instead of selecting alternatives 
Factor 2:  
Policy fit 
 
 substantial or little patient choice and prizing information in the healthcare 
system 
 relevant CJEU case law (not) implemented 
 (not) accustomed to cross-border healthcare 
Impact of bounded 
rationality on factor 2 if: 
 limited institutional memory and experience concerning cross-border 
healthcare policies 
 confusion among actors concerning the extent of misfit 
 confusion among actors concerning what timely and correct transposition 
means 
Factor 3: Heterogeneity of 
preferences among veto 
players 
 veto players: sub-national authorities, parliament and ministries involved: 
yes/no 
 diverging preferences concerning the directive among (informal) veto players 
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Impact of bounded 
rationality on factor 3 if: 
 actors have non-existing, partial or changing preferences 
 limited understanding of consequences of non-compliance 
 policy-entrepreneur uses the directive for different purposes 
Table 2: potential indicators of the three explanatory factors and bounded rationality’s impact on transposition 
 
Whereas Denmark and the Netherlands are often considered to be member states with relatively strong 
administrative capacities, they differ on policy fit and veto actors. Denmark is expected to face greater 
difficulty in transposing the directive than the Netherlands. As will be explained in detail below, the 
Netherlands has had more experience with cross-border healthcare. It also implemented the relevant 
CJEU case law before the directive was proposed, while Denmark has been reluctant to do so. The Dutch 
system of regulatory competition among health providers and health insurance companies also seems 
to better fit the directive’s emphasis on free choice than the public planning underlying the Danish 
national health service system. In addition, regions may act as veto players in the decentralised Danish 
healthcare system. On first sight, Denmark would thus face greater challenges in transposing the 
directive timely and correctly than the Netherlands.  
 
4. The Danish transposition of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare 
Danish healthcare is provided by means of a national health service (NHS) system, which offers 
healthcare as benefits-in-kind, tax-financed, largely free of charge and publicly supplied. The system can 
be characterised as a decentralised, public, integrated healthcare system in which the responsibility for 
organising and delivering services is placed in the hands of the five Danish regions (Martinsen and 
Vrangbæk 2008). Primary care services are provided by private practitioners, i.e., general practitioners 
(GPs), but are publicly funded and firmly integrated into regional planning. General practitioners serve 
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as important gatekeepers in the system, referring patients to specialised care and hospital care. 
Treatment is largely provided free of charge, but co-payments exist, primarily for medicine, dentistry 
and physiotherapy.  
Territoriality is a deeply entrenched principle in the Danish healthcare system. Danish prior 
authorisation for healthcare treatment in other member states has been very limited. In the Danish legal 
proposal to implement the patients’ rights directive, the Danish government estimated that the regions 
in total receive approximately 60 applications for prior authorisation annually, of which approximately 
10 are granted (Interviews, November 2012; August 2013).2 In addition, regarding the inflow of foreign 
patients, Denmark has traditionally refused access for planned treatment. The Danish Ministry of Health 
has, as of July 2008, informed the regions that public hospitals cannot charge foreign patients for care 
provided, meaning that a foreign patient cannot receive planned treatment at a Danish public hospital, if 
not authorised by means of Regulation 883/2004.3 An EU citizen can access public healthcare in 
Denmark only by means of the EU health insurance card, if residing in Denmark or if authorised to 
receive planned treatment under Regulation 883/2004 but not directly on private initiative. Thus the 
boundaries of Danish healthcare are quite tight, with limited, firm, publicly controlled access and exit 
possibilities. 
 
4.1. The process of transposition in Denmark 
The Danish position on EU regulation of the healthcare sector has been rather reluctant. The Danish 
implementation of CJEU case law can be characterised as defensive and minimal, mirroring the country’s 
highly sceptical position concerning the application of internal market principles in healthcare 
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 See L 33 ”Forslag til lov om ændring af sundhedsloven og lov om klage- og erstatningsadgang inden for sundhedsvæsenet”, 
p.20; presented October, 3d 2013. 
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(Martinsen and Vrangbæk 2008). The Danish Ministry of Health long only allowed cross-border 
healthcare for health services for which the patient paid part of the cost him/herself. Following fierce 
critiques from the Danish ombudsman and the Danish Social Appeals Board, this was extended to also 
cover cross-border specialist treatment (Martinsen 2013). Thus Denmark entered Council negotiations 
on the Patients’ Rights directive and its subsequent transposition with a limited national tradition in 
cross-border healthcare. The boundaries of the Danish healthcare system largely remained intact 
despite an internal healthcare market that was announced long ago by the CJEU. Furthermore, the 
policy fit between the European notion of free movement in healthcare and the Danish healthcare 
policy was poor. After initial opposition, the Danish government voted in favour of the directive. In this 
way, it accepted that doctors from other member states can refer patients for further treatment in 
Denmark, despite that the government and regions (the other veto player in the transposition phase) 
strongly preferred to maintain the exclusive gatekeeper role of Danish GPs. 
The transposition process began in summer 2011 with the Ministry of Health as the responsible unit. For 
the first two year, transposition was a rather secluded process, in reality only involving few – but new - 
civil servants in the Ministry. Cross-border healthcare had long been administered by the same two 
senior civil servants in the Ministry, who had become key experts on the relevant regulatory framework, 
with established and regular contacts with the Danish regions. The Ministry of Health had, however, 
experienced major reorganisations, including budget cuts entailing substantial redundancies. One of the 
civil servants in charge had been fired and the other reassigned to other functions outside the 
department. The senior civil servant who had also played a key role in Council negotiations initiated the 
transposition process. When that person was fired from the Ministry, transposition was de facto placed 
on hold for approximately one year (Interview, July 2013). The new civil servant assigned the 
responsibility had no previous experience with the issue of cross-border healthcare and also was 
responsible for performing other departmental tasks. In reality, few and inconsistent resources were 
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devoted to transposition, making the specific sectoral administrative capacity low. The initial phase was 
marked by a considerable loss of institutional memory.  
In the initial phase of transposition, the Ministry organised a reference group in which the regions, 
relevant agencies and the municipalities represented by Local Government Denmark participated with 
the Ministry of Health. However, the regions and municipalities found that the reference group primarily 
served to allow the Ministry to present its considerations but did not grant them influence on 
transposition (Interview, November 2012). Moreover, the patient organisations felt that they were 
excluded, finding transposition to be a very closed process involving a few civil servants in the Ministry; 
“It is like they fear losing their grip. Therefore it just becomes more meetings where we are briefed. It’s 
one-way communication. (..) there is no invitation to establish a dialogue” (Interview, November 2012).  
For the first two years, the Ministry of Health was largely the only actor involved. However, its 
preparatory work was marked by unsettled consideration in the hands of new civil servants who had 
inherited a dossier that they had not negotiated and for which they had no relevant experience. Rather 
than strategies and clear preferences, main actors were unsure of how to cope with ‘very difficult rules’ 
(Interview, August 2012). Furthermore, the aims, principles and the basic logic of this task were found to 
challenge the Danish healthcare legacy, ‘forcing us to think along more market-based logics’ (Interview, 
July 2013). This clearly influenced their capacity and attention span. Key actors found themselves 
‘operating in a sort of knowledge gap’, ‘trying to look to what the others (other member states) do’ 
(Interview, August 2012).  
The regions expected that they would play an influential role in transposition but found themselves 
excluded (interviews, August 2012, November 2012, August 2013). As the governance level responsible 
for delivering healthcare and the practical application of the directive, there were numerous concerns 
and frustrations. The regions raised concerns regarding how to address patients’ demands for cross-
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border healthcare, expecting them to only grow in the future. They thus expected the transposition 
process to also account for practical application, address alternative solutions and foresee their effects. 
According to the regions, it was highly important that the functions and resources of the contact point 
would match citizens’ demands. It did not find the Ministry’s solution of relying on existing ‘patient 
supervisors’ in the regions to be adequate. Existing institutions were not considered sufficient solutions. 
In addition, the regions found the fact that foreign patients could now access planned healthcare in 
Denmark a particular challenge. While the Ministry highlighted Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) prices as 
the natural level of price setting, again echoing existing solutions, the regions noted that the DRG is a 
rather abstract means of price setting, which fails to disaggregate the various components of a 
healthcare service or specify when a healthcare treatment begins and ends (interviews, August 2012, 
November 2012, August 2013). DRG prices might be effective in interactions between regions and 
national healthcare providers having learned to trust this price mechanism, but in an internal market, 
they hardly constitute transparent or full prices. Furthermore, as public hospitals had not been allowed 
to charge foreign patients for healthcare provided, there was no experience to draw upon. In summary, 
whereas the Ministry seemed to prefer to address contact points and price-setting through existing 
structures, i.e., ‘business as usual’, habituation and routine, the regions found this solution inadequate 
and considered it insufficient for practical application. The regions found that the Ministry did not 
sufficiently consider issues of practical application or the full effects of the directive;  
“This is a big change. Potentially it can affect many. The whole system is in play. (...) This is not just a 
question of some patient supervisors having to do something more. It’s a question of gearing the whole 
system. This is about all the doctors and nurses out there, who also have to be able to handle the situation 
when a foreign patient comes in. Advise and guide them. We need to set up a system that can issue 
invoices and send payment reminders. We are not exactly used to this” (Interview, August 2013).  
The Danish law to transpose the Directive was initially expected in December 2012, then January 2013, 
and subsequently in April 2013. The lack of resources and experience in the Ministry and the degree of 
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legal uncertainty regarded the Directive were noted as the primary explanations for the delay 
(interviews, June 2013, August 2013). On the June 28th, 2013 the proposed law was finally presented to 
the Danish parliament on October 3d, 2013. The proposal consists of one law and five ministerial orders.  
Denmark did not meet the transposition deadline. According to the relevant law adopted in December 
2013 (in force from January 2014), authorisation has to be issued for hospital care and ‘highly 
specialised and high cost care’ not requiring hospitalisation.4 The law obliges the Danish Health and 
Medicines Authority to issue a list indicating which treatments require prior authorisation, which are all 
treatments requiring at least one night of hospitalisation plus all treatments listed in the ‘plan for 
specialisation’ (specialeplanen). This plan comprises specialised treatments that can only be provided at 
hospitals authorised by the Danish Health and Medicine Authority. The list simply links to the website of 
the ‘plan for specialisation’, where a somewhat overwhelming range of treatments appear, including 
several requiring minor specialisations. There is no further justification for why this whole range of 
treatments requires authorisation and no governmental willingness to issue a list of which treatments 
can be accessed directly without prior certification from the Danish health authorities.5 Furthermore, it 
remains unclear when the Danish authorities are obliged to issue authorisation. Applications will be 
made to one of the regional councils (democratically elected bodies in each region), which may have an 
interest in restricting the outflow of patients. A patient refusing to go abroad can complain, but to the 
National Agency for Patients' Rights and Complaints, which is also the institution responsible for 
supervising the work of the contact points. This institutional proximity is likely to condition its ability to 
conduct its tasks as an institution of appeal and redress objectively and in a non-discriminatory manner, 
as set out in article 9 of the directive. Finally, the resources allocated to implementation are considered 
inadequate. No new institutions will be established as ‘contact points’. Instead, the existing ‘patient 
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  Danish law proposal, L33, as adopted December, 20th 2013; § 89 
5






supervisors’ in the regions will serve as contact points, with the National Agency for Patients' Rights and 
Complaints serving a coordinating function for the regional contact points.6 Overall, the changes to 
national legislation are not assumed to result in additional costs for the Danish healthcare budget or its 
administration.7 The regions consider this to be unrealistic and not in keeping with practical implications 
of the Directive, and hence they demand compensation from the state to fund and administer the 
additional costs that they foresee (Interview, August 2013; see also the hearings submitted by the 
regions).  
 
4.2 On Limited Capacity, Habituation and Bounded Rationality  
The Danish transposition of the patient rights directive was not timely. Furthermore, Denmark has made 
extensive use of the prior authorisation procedure in its transposition, which is not considered to be in 
compliance with the directive according to legal experts (DR news, 24 October 2013). Finally, 
transposition is regarded as inadequate with respect to practical application.  
The Danish transposition did not reflect strong administrative capacity. On the contrary, the 
organisational and cognitive constraints within an administration with limited resources were apparent. 
On the one hand, poor administrative capacity resulted in a limited attention span, in which little time 
was allocated to consider alternatives and their effects. Instead of considering a more complete set of 
alternatives, the administration’s responses sought routine and habituation, opting to rely on pre-
existing national solutions. Other actors, including the regions, found it difficult to influence the process. 
Instead of shared knowledge and dialogue, the process was found to be secluded, delayed and difficult 
to access. In such a situation, heterogeneity of preferences becomes rather irrelevant, as transposition is 
                                                          
6
 L33, pp.22-23. 
7
 Idem, pp.25-27. 
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de facto in the hands of the ministerial actors alone. In a transposition process characterised by limited 
capacity, the actors opted for what was manageable within the limited set of options that the disturbing 
principles of the directive allowed. The Danish government could not turn back the clock and preserve 
the Danish GPs’ role as gatekeepers, deny foreign patients access to Danish healthcare or refuse to 
reimburse residents for medicine purchased in another member state. However, it was able to focus on 
prior authorisation, and so it did. Here, the government maximised its attention and extended the use of 
authorisation beyond what is considered correct.  
 
5. The transposition of the patients’ rights directive in the Netherlands 
The Dutch healthcare system comprises a public framework in which mostly private actors provide, 
purchase and insure healthcare. It consists of three components. First, the National Exceptional Medical 
Expenses Act (Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten, AWBZ) is a universal, obligatory, and income-
dependent insurance scheme covering long-term and high-cost medical treatments since 1968. In 
practice, clients generally receive AWBZ care as benefits-in-kind from contracted providers. Second, the 
Health Insurance Act (Zorgverzekeringswet, Zvw) is a universal and compulsory insurance scheme for 
basic healthcare in place since 2006. According to the Zvw, private health insurers have to accept any 
client. Clients can change health insurers on an annual basis. Insurers can offer two policies through 
which they reimburse patients for healthcare obtained anywhere in the world (maximised by the 
average tariffs on the Dutch market) or selectively contract with healthcare providers (if necessary 
abroad) to provide healthcare to their clients (although clients can obtain healthcare from non-
contracted providers and receive reimbursement up to a certain level). The Zvw is financed through 
premiums paid directly to the health insurers and income-dependent contributions and taxes. In both 
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Zvw and AWBZ, clients require a GP referral to access specialist care. Finally, the third component 
comprises complementary, voluntary health insurance. 
Particularly since the early 1990s, patients’ rights to informed consent, information, privacy, and quality 
of care, complaint procedures and choice have been extended. However, patient choice was not 
previously uncommon. The Zvw of 2006 replaced an obligatory and public form of health insurance and 
a voluntary and private one. Privately insured individuals (nearly one-third of the population) could 
freely select a health provider for treatment. Notwithstanding this tradition of patient choice, insurers’ 
selective contracting with health providers has remained the basic organisational logic of the new Zvw, 
particularly for reasons of cost containment. To both facilitate patient choice and selective contracting 
by health insurers, increasing amounts of information on the quality and safety of care and pricing have 
been made available. 
 
5.1 The process of transposition in the Netherlands 
The obligatory public health insurance scheme preceding the Zvw had a system of prior authorisation to 
obtain planned healthcare from (foreign) non-contracted providers. The AWBZ still operates such a 
system. Until the 1980s, cross-border care remained limited to occasional airlifts for heart surgery and 
an arrangement for clients from a relatively isolated border region who could more easily access Belgian 
hospital care. Growing awareness of a borderless Europe in the early 1990s led not only to greater 
territorial circumscription of AWBZ health consumption but also to studies and experiments regarding 
cross-border healthcare, particularly in the border province of Limburg (Vollaard 2004). Furthermore, 
the increasing salience of waiting lists in the late 1990s prompted health insurance funds to facilitate 
access to Belgian and German health providers. In 2002, Dutch health insurers had contracts with 21 
hospitals and 136 other health providers abroad. Although many Dutch report that they are willing to 
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use cross-border care, in practice, cross-border patient mobility has remained limited (Van der Schee 
and Delnoij 2004). Dutch patients received approximately 28,000 treatments (excluding emergency and 
long-term care) annually in Belgium between 2007 and 2010 (Observatorium voor Patiëntenmobiliteit 
2012). In the Netherlands, 10,536 hospitalisations involved foreigners, principally from Belgium, 
Luxembourg and Germany in 2007, which represents 0.60% of the total number of hospitalisations 
(Vandermeulen 2009). 
The CJEU verdicts on cross-border healthcare raised considerable concerns in the Dutch healthcare 
sector concerning the sustainability of its system of (selective) contracting and GP referral in the face of 
the free movement of goods and services (Vollaard 2004). In its verdicts, also concerning Dutch cases, to 
the relief of the Dutch, the CJEU indicated that certain exemptions from free movement are justified. 
Notwithstanding these concerns, free patient choice in Europe also received sympathy from certain 
parliamentarians and even ministers of health. Ministers also perceived cross-border healthcare as a 
useful safety valve for the waiting lists and did not expect cross-border patient mobility to grow rapidly 
based on the experiments and studies mentioned above (Vollaard 2004). In response to CJEU case law, 
the Dutch government abolished the distinction between domestic and foreign non-contracted 
providers, allowed access to non-hospital care without prior authorisation, and replaced national with 
international medical standards to determine the medical necessity of receiving healthcare elsewhere. 
The new Zvw of 2006 abolished the system of prior authorisation for basic healthcare. Regarding CJEU 
case law, however, the Zvw’s explanatory memorandum indicated that the level of reimbursement 
should not discourage clients from obtaining healthcare within the EU. Moreover, many health 




After the codification of CJEU case law, the health sector perceived any European legal initiative on 
cross-border healthcare as rather redundant. Partly reflecting the Eurosceptic mood following the 
referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty in 2005, the Dutch government responded very 
reluctantly to the draft directive in 2008 (interviews February 2012).8 It eventually accepted the 
necessity of a directive for the member states that did not comply with CJEU case law, but stated, “our 
aim is that we don’t have to change anything in the Netherlands when we adopt that directive.”9 The 
actively involved parliament initially regarded the draft directive as a violation of the principle of 
subsidiarity, as the organisation and financing of healthcare systems is primarily a national 
competence.10 Parliament welcomed the final version of the directive, except for the left-populist SP, 
which perceived the directive as an instance of neo-liberal marketisation of health. 
The government voted in favour of the directive, as it believed that the directive confirmed the Dutch 
interpretation of CJEU case law. The health minister consequently argued that with respect to the 
directive’s aim of codifying CJEU case law on reimbursement for cross-border healthcare, 
“[i]mplementation is in the case of the Netherlands not necessary, because the Netherlands already 
meets the requirements”.11 The implementation plan adopted in November 2011 indicated that no 
legislative changes were necessary except for the establishment of a National Contact Point (NCP) and 
the mutual recognition of prescriptions. One of the Dutch negotiators of the directive coordinated the 
transposition process in the Ministry of Health. The ministry waited for further clarification on the NCP 
and prescriptions before taking further steps (Interview, February 2012).12 The Ministry of Health did 
not consult the Dutch health sector (Interviews, February 2012; August 2013) but welcomed a visit by 
                                                          
8
 cf. Documents First Chamber 2007-2008, 31.545F, letter of Minister of Health IZ-CB-U-2881572 (November, 3d 2008) 
9
 Documents Second Chamber, 2009-2010, 21.501, no.228, Health Council (December, 15th 2010); cf. Documents Second 
Chamber, 2008-2009, 21.501-31, no.160, Health Council (December, 8th 2008); Documents Second Chamber 2008-2009, 
21.501-31, no.174, Health Council (May, 29th 2009). 
10
 Documents First Chamber 2008-2009, 31.545, no.5, Subsidiarity check directive (October, 2d 2008) 
11
 Documents Second Chamber, 2010-2011, 21.501-31, no.235, Letter Minister of Health IZ3053582 (March, 4th 2011) 
12
 See also Proceedings Second Chamber, 2011-2012, App.2664, Questions MP Voortman (April, 18th 2012) 
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DG SANCO officials in the autumn of 2012 and maintained contacts with fellow member states on the 
Committee of Cross-border Healthcare. Dutch representatives did not wish to play an active role in that 
Brussels committee for reasons of limited administrative capacity and the prevailing Eurosceptic political 
climate (interviews, February 2012; August 2013). Once a new transposition coordinator took office in 
the spring of 2012, concerns regarding timely transposition were growing in the health ministry. 
Confusion existed concerning the responsibilities of the directorates International Affairs, 
Pharmaceuticals, and Health Insurance (interview August 2013). The transposition also suffered from a 
lack of priority due to the impression that the Netherlands was already prepared and the change in 
personnel. However, the new civil servants could still rely on their predecessors and other experts to 
regarding all details of the cross-border healthcare dossier. 
The ministry discussed several options for providing information to outgoing and incoming patients. 
Dutch health insurers could not serve as an independent source of information for their own clients, 
while they were not interested in offering information to clients from abroad (interviews, February 
2012; August 2013). Contracting with a company to provide information to outgoing and incoming 
patients after a public tender procedure was eventually rejected as too inflexible and administratively 
time-consuming. In the winter of 2013, the ministry asked the Health Insurance Board (College voor 
Zorgverzekeringen; CVZ) to elaborate plans on a “slim version” of an NCP with a website and telephone 
service to inform patients about health quality policies and patients’ rights and refer them to individual 
health providers or health insurers for additional information (Interview, October 2013). The CVZ 
advises on the basic healthcare package, administers health insurance budgets, and manages the Social 
Security Coordination Regulation. Additionally, it was re-christened the Healthcare Institute in April 
2014, also offering information on health quality, quality guidelines and the actual performance of 
health providers. The CVZ was considered the best candidate to be a NCP, and it expressed its 
willingness to be one. By early October 2013, the ministry of health officially designated the CVZ as the 
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Dutch NCP. It has yet to specify the new NCP tasks in law, as is required for all CVZ tasks according to the 
Zvw. For its part, CVZ “groped in the dark” concerning the requirements of an NCP (Interview, October 
2013). The division of responsibilities regarding information sharing between member states, health 
providers and the NCP was unclear (Interview October 2013). The number and nature of contacts 
remained a “large uncertainty”. The CVZ largely relied on a report issued in December 2012 on behalf of 
the European Commission regarding establishing a website as centrepiece of the NCP. The Dutch 
website (www.cbhc.nl) with a contact form is planned to be operational in the summer of 2014. A direct 
telephone service will not be offered, as it is considered excessively expensive. 
The implementing directive on the mutual recognition of prescriptions, published in December 2012, 
included specific rules on prescriptions to be incorporated in national legislation. One month too late, on 
November, 18th 2013, the Regulation Medicines Act was amended to this effect.13 On December, 18th 
2013, the Dutch government notified the European Commission of the transposition of both the 
patient’s rights and the implementing directives. From the perspective of the ministry, the transposition 
process was thus largely completed on schedule. Nevertheless, the Dutch transposition was subject to 
intense criticism from the outset. According to an independent legal expert, the government had much 
more “homework” to do (Van de Gronden 2011). First, the existing possibility to limit reimbursement of 
care received from non-contracted providers could discourage patients from using the generally non-
contracted foreign providers, violating the principal of free access, particularly in extramural care. In 
addition, the choice between the directive and Social Security Coordination Regulation should be 
adopted in the Zvw. Furthermore, the incorporation of the right of cross-border healthcare and a system 
of prior authorisation into the Zvw would much more effectively guarantee patients’ rights vis-à-vis 
health insurers (Interview, October 2013). Ultimately, directives do not have direct force in the private-
law relationships between patients and insurers 
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 Staatscourant 2013 (November, 25th 2013), no. 33012 
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Criticism regarding incorrect transposition became more widespread when, in the autumn of 2011, the 
Ministry of Health expressed its desire to allow health insurers to fully refuse reimbursement for both 
extramural and intramural healthcare received from non-contracted providers (including foreign ones), 
as long as they indicate this refusal in health insurance policies in a timely and clear manner. The 
Ministry of Health reasoned that the patients’ rights directive would allow it to do so, as it replaced the 
relevant CJEU case law. However, as Dutch health insurers have not many contracts with foreign health 
providers, the latter would be indirectly discriminated against while clients would be discouraged from 
seeking healthcare from foreign providers (Van de Gronden 2013; Van der Touw 2013). In addition, non-
contracted care has not been acknowledged as an exemption to the free movement of health goods and 
services in EU law. The Dutch government argues that patients can still opt for a (more expensive) 
reimbursement policy with a free choice of health providers. However, while the aim of this directive is 
to codify relevant CJEU case law, the Dutch government has employed it to return patients’ rights to the 
situation that existed before the CJEU case law developed since 1998, as the refusal to reimburse non-
contracted providers even concerns extramural cross-border care. It is therefore unsurprising that the 
European Commission regarded the proposal as a violation of EU law.14 The government’s attempt to 
contain cross-border healthcare has been accompanied by a special inquiry into the rising costs of cross-
border healthcare. The government seeks to maintain control of cross-border patient mobility, as it 
fears that increased use of healthcare abroad could reverse domestic efforts at health cost 
containment.15 
 
5.2 Policy-entrepreneurs and institutional memory 
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 Documents European Parliament, E-004616/2013, Questions MEP Van Oomen and De Lange (April, 25th 2013) 
15
 Documents Second Chamber, 2013-2014, 33.750, no.2, 37-38, State Budget (September, 17th 2013). 
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In contrast to all expectations, the directive was not transposed entirely on schedule in the Netherlands. 
The mutual recognition of prescriptions and the NCP tasks executed by the CVZ were not incorporated 
into national legislation before October, 25th 2013. More strikingly, the Dutch government attempted 
to make its health insurance legislation less in keeping with the directive. This demonstrates how a 
policy-entrepreneur can exploit a certain solution (the directive) to combat a different problem (cost 
containment) than planned (the codification of CJEU case law). More aspects of the Dutch transposition 
process reflected bounded rationality. The fluidity of personnel, the directive’s limited priority and an 
unclear division of responsibilities led to delays in transposition. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Health 
considered various alternatives for establishing a NCP and selected the most rational option with 
respect to costs and benefits. Moreover, the change in personnel did not result in a loss of expertise. 
Nevertheless, as the proposal to limit reimbursements for non-contracted healthcare indicates, accurate 
information does not entail compliance with EU law. The emerging Dutch reservations concerning EU 
interference and cross-border healthcare have resulted in a growing divergence between the directive’s 
goals and the preferences of the Dutch government and parliament. It is thus the heterogeneity of 
preferences between the national and EU levels rather than confusion regarding the contents of 




The decision-making process of the patients’ rights directive was marked by controversy. Has its 
transposition simply been a continuation of the conflicts by other means? In the cases of both Denmark 
and the Netherlands, continuing reluctance regarding EU interference in the organisation and financing 
of national healthcare is clearly present. Nevertheless, the delayed and incorrect transposition of the 
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patients’ right directive is not simply a matter of antagonistic preferences. Moreover, it is also not 
possible that a simple misfit could explain the transposition processes in Denmark. Cognitive and 
organisational constraints such as the fluidity of participants, the loss of institutional memory, and a lack 
of priority certainly also had their effects, particularly in the Danish case. The scholarly literature has 
emphasised how organisational complexities such as the autonomy and multiplicity of actors and levels 
of government involved foster bounded rationality. The case studies above also emphasise the fragility 
of the limited number of staff members working on a certain decision. As the Danish case revealed, the 
dismissal and replacement of two experts reduced institutional expertise and memory. Transposition is 
likely highly conditional on the availability and consistency of expertise. This implies an organisational 
fragility, which may be a reason for the inconsistencies in the explanations of timely and correct 
transposition, as it requires not country-level or policy-specific but issue-specific knowledge on the part 
of the (few) civil servants involved. 
The Dutch case also demonstrated how staff expertise is not necessarily lost after a change in personnel, 
as the predecessors and other experts remained available to the new staff. Cognitive and organisational 
constraints on (rational) decision-making may thus not be equally distributed across countries, policy 
sectors, or administrative units. Future research should therefore explore conditions under which EU 
legislation would be properly implemented from the perspective of bounded rationality. A lack of 
experience with transposition has already been identified as explanatory factor for delayed and 
incorrect transposition (Berglund et al. 2006; Steunenberg and Rhinard 2010). Mismatches between EU 
directives and national policies have also been identified as explanation (Steunenberg and Toshkov 
2009). A larger misfit suggests greater uncertainty and ambiguity regarding how the directive should be 
transposed. This seems all the more likely when member states have to transpose new, complex 
directives offering substantial policy discretion in a relatively short time (cf. Kaeding 2006; Steunenberg 
and Toshkov 2009). The transposition process of new, complex directives are expected to entail greater 
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uncertainty and ambiguity concerning how they should be transposed among the actors in the policy 
sectors involved, whereas the time allotted to consider alternatives and their effects is rather limited. As 
the cases studies revealed, a bounded rationality perspective can thus be a fertile addition to the 
existing, yet inconclusive, explanations for timely and correctly transposition given the complexities of 
the multi-level European Union. 
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